I. INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates the effects of shocks to U. S. monetary policy on exchange rates. In sharp contrast to the literature we find substantial evidence of a link between monetary policy and exchange rates. Specifically, according to our results a contractionary shock to U. S. monetary policy leads to (i) persistent, significant appreciations in U. S. nominal and real exchange rates and (ii) significant, persistent deviations from uncovered interest rate parity in favor of U. S. investments.
Our analysis builds on the literature aimed at explaining the fundamental sources of exchange rate determination and the link between alternative exchange rate regimes and international business cycles.1 In contrast to much of this literature, we investigate how exchange rates respond to a specific impulse, namely a shock to monetary policy. We focus on conditional correlations because of the difficulty of interpreting unconditional correlations in environments where agents are subject to multiple sources of uncertainty. Consider, for example, the widely noted fact that real exchange rates have been substantially more variable after the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreements. Mussa [1986] argues that this reflects the importance of sluggish price adjustment and the increased 1. For recent surveys of empirical research on nominal exchange rates, see Engel [1995] , Frankel and Rose [1994] , and Lewis [1994] . See Backus and Kehoe [1992] and the references therein for work on the links between business cycles and exchange rates. in our analyses. Section III presents our empirical results. Section IV relates our results to the literature on the forward premium bias. Concluding remarks are contained in Section V.
II. MEASURING SHOCKS TO MONETARY POLICY
To measure the effects of shocks to monetary policy, we must take a stand on an empirical measure of those shocks. Here we consider three measures: orthogonalized components of the innovation to the ratio of nonborrowed to total reserves, orthogonalized components of the innovation to the federal funds rate, and the Romer and Romer [1989] index of monetary policy contractions.
The basic strategy underlying the first two measures is to identify monetary policy shocks with the disturbance term in a regression equation of the form, Here Vt is the time t setting of the monetary authority's policy instrument, t is a linear function, flt is the information set available to the monetary authority when Vt is set, and EVt is a serially uncorrelated shock that is orthogonal to the elements of fQt. To rationalize interpreting EVt as an exogenous policy shock, (1) must be viewed as the monetary authority's decision rule for setting Vt. In addition, the orthogonality conditions on EVt correspond to the assumption that date t policy shocks do not affect the elements of fQt. The first two measures of policy shocks that we use correspond to different specifications of Vt and ft. Conditional on this specification, the dynamic response of a variable to a monetary policy shock corresponds to the regression coefficients of the variable on current and lagged values of the residuals to equation
(1). Feedback rule (1) can be thought of as emerging from an infinite horizon optimal control problem in which the monetary authority maximizes the expected value of a criterion function subject to the constraints of technology and private agents' decision rules.3 Under this interpretation, the shock EVt might reflect exogenous shocks to the preferences of the monetary authority, perhaps due to shifts in the relative weight given to unemployment and inflation. More generally, EVt could reflect a variety of random 3. The optimal decision rule will be linear if the monetary authority has a quadratic criterion function and linear constraints. Alternatively, (1) can be viewed as a linear approximation to the true decision rule.
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factors that affect policy decisions. These include the personalities and views of the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), political factors, as well as technical factors like measurement error in the data available to the FOMC when they decide on policy actions.
Less favorable to our procedure, the shock EVt could reflect error in the way we have specified the monetary authority's decision rule. For example, the Fed's decision rule could have changed during the sample period that we consider. One way to deal with this problem is to investigate the robustness of inference to splits in the sample. Evans [1994] and Lewis [1993] look at weekly exchange rate data for two subsamples of the 1974-1990 period. Using a VAR-based identification scheme slightly different from ours, they obtain results similar to ours. A different possibility is that the Fed's decision rule is nonlinear. In the extreme case V, would be an exact nonlinear function of ft. Under these circumstances, the estimated time series EVt would entirely reflect the error involved in approximating a nonlinear function with a linear function. A different form of nonlinearity might arise if the actual decision rule of the Fed involves moving Vt by discrete amounts. For example, each period the Fed chooses between not changing the federal funds rate at all or moving it by 25, 50, or 75 basis points. Since decision rule (1) assumes that Vt has continuous support, the estimated time series on EVt would in part reflect specification error. In general, these types of specification errors imply that our procedure for isolating shocks to monetary policy is not valid. But absent taking a stand on the precise nonlinearities in the Fed's decision rule, it is hard to say whether these sources of error would substantively affect inference.
Conditional on these caveats, the procedure that we use to estimate the effects of exogenous shocks to policy is asymptotically equivalent to computing the impulse response function of a variable to a particular shock in an appropriately identified Vector Autoregression (VAR). Denote the set of variables in the VAR by Zt Dornbusch [1976] , since, in those models, a contractionary monetary policy shock generates a large initial appreciation in nominal (and real) exchange rates followed by subsequent depreciations. However, our results could be viewed as supporting a broader view 8. These were computed using the method described in Doan [1990] , example 10.1, using 500 draws from the estimated asymptotic distribution of the vector autoregressive coefficients and covariance matrix of the innovations.
9. The shock to NBRXt equals -1.16 percent, -1.21 percent, -1.18 percent, -1.19 percent and -1.18 percent for the case in which Japan, Germany, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom are the foreign country included in the VAR. for a prolonged period of time after a contractionary monetary shock. And for each case we can easily reject the hypothesis that the individual coefficients in the response functions equal zero. We conclude that, after a contractionary monetary policy shock, the expected returns from investing in foreign short-term bonds falls relative to the returns from investing in short-term U. S. Treasury bills. Moreover, these excess returns are persistent. This persistence is consistent with the fact that future changes in the exchange rate tend to be negatively related to the forward premium.
In principle, one could construct a variety of statistics to summarize the "shape" of the impulse response functions as a way of characterizing the dynamic response of exchange rates to policy shocks. For example, we could ask whether various impulse response functions are identically equal to zero. We find it more revealing to consider the average response of s For and s For to a time t monetary shock over various time horizons, say from time t + i to time t + j. We denote these responses by LForR( J), and puFor(iJ), respectively. In population these are equal to the average value of coefficients i through j of the corresponding impulse response Notice that in every case the estimated correlation is positive and significantly different from zero. Rows (2) through (7) report the estimated values of I ForR(UJ), {(i j) = (1,6),(7,12). .. ,(31,36)}, respectively. For each country there exist a number of horizons for which we can reject, at conventional significance levels, the hypothesis that ,LFor,R( ,J) = 0. Indeed for Germany, France, and Italy, this hypothesis can be rejected for every specification of (ij) at the 5 percent significance level. Consistent with Figure I , these rejections are not the strongest for the early periods.
Row (8) reports the maximal impact of a negative monetary policy shock on S 'r. In every case the point estimate of this statistic 11. We cannot use the standard deviation bands about the estimated impulse response functions in Figure I to formally test hypotheses about LForR(iJ) and PuFor(i,J). This is because each element in these bands summarizes the sampling uncertainty in the corresponding element of the estimated impulse response function, not taking into account the covariance between the different coefficients. To deal with this problem, we calculated standard errors for these statistics using the method described in footnote 2, with one modification. For each Monte Carlo draw we computed the values of VLFOrR(iJ) and VtFor(i,J). We then calculated the standard deviation of these statistics across the 500 Monte Carlo draws. Alternatively, inference could be based on the empirical distribution function of these statistics. In practice, we found that inference was very robust across the two procedures. We conclude this subsection by discussing the overall contribution of monetary shocks to the variability of exchange rates. To this end, we computed the percentage of the variance of the k step ahead forecast error that is attributable to monetary shocks. As k goes to infinity, this corresponds to the percentage of the variance of exchange rates that is due to monetary shocks. Row (10) of Tables Ia and Ib reports the average of this percentage over the 31-to 36-month horizon for real and nominal exchange rates, respectively. The estimated percentages range from a low of 18 percent (United Kingdom, nominal exchange rates) to a high of 43 percent (Germany, real). While there is substantial sampling uncertainty associated with these point estimates, in the case of Germany, Italy, and France, we can easily reject the hypothesis that the percentage is zero, for either real or nominal exchange rates. The rejections are more marginal for Japan and the United Kingdom.
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An important restriction of our benchmark specification is the assumption that only the difference between foreign and U. S. interest rates is relevant for exchange rate determination. While this restriction is quite natural from the perspective of various theoretical models, it is desirable to assess the impact of relaxing it. To this end, we now discuss the results of considering a specification in which foreign and U. S. interest rates enter separately. There are two additional advantages to doing this. First, we can explicitly assess the impact of policy shocks on the level of domestic and foreign interest rates. Second, we can more easily compare results obtained with NBRX-based policy shock measures with those obtained using interest-rate-based policy shock measures.
In expanding the benchmark specification, we must deal with the issue ofjust how many variables to include in the analysis. This Figure II) . Interestingly, despite the large dimensionality of the VAR, the dynamic response functions of EtPTFor are estimated quite accurately. This is confirmed by the formal tests reported in Table V . We conclude that the failure of the strict overshooting hypothesis and the emergence of expected excess returns is robust to allowing RFor and R us to enter the VARs separately.
Finally, row (10) of Tables Ha and IIb reports Tables IIIa and IIIb, which are the  exact analogs to Tables Ha and MIb. A number of key results emerge from these tables. First, innovations to the federal funds rate are negatively correlated with innovations to nominal and real exchange rates (see Row (1)). The hypothesis that these correlations equal zero in population can be easily rejected for the Japanese, German, Italian, and French cases. The rejection is more marginal for the United Kingdom. Second, there is very strong statistical evidence that monetary policy shocks affect real and nominal exchange rates. For example, except for the United Kingdom, the hypothesis that PLForR(i,j) equals zero can be rejected, at the 4 percent significance level or better, for all six specifications of (ij). In the U. K. case we can reject this hypothesis at the 5 percent significance level in four out of six specifications (i,j). Third, the hypothesis that the maximal impact of a monetary policy shock on SR tr and s For equals zero can be strongly rejected (see row (8)). Fourth, we find substantial evidence that the maximal effect of a policy shock does not occur contemporaneously (see row (9)). Finally, Table V indicates that we can easily reject the hypothesis that the average response of EtTtr for the first half year after a policy shock is equal to zero. Tables IIIa and IIIb reports the average percentage of the forecast error variance over the 31-to-36-month horizon for real and nominal exchange rates that is attributable to moneary shocks. For all countries, except the United Kingdom, monetary shocks are estimated to account for over 20 percent of the variance of real and nominal exchange rates. Also notice that there is less sampling uncertainty with this measure of monetary shocks than with NBRX-based measures. So once we move to federal funds-based measures of policy shocks, we find substantial evidence that an important percentage of the variability of exchange rates can be attributed to policy shocks.
We now report results obtained using the Romer and Romer [1989] index of monetary policy. Figure IV reports results obtained from a VAR that includes U. S. industrial production (Y), the U. S. Consumer Price Level (P), foreign output (yFor), the foreign interest rate (RFor), the ratio of NBR to TR (NBRX), the real exchange rate (SRFr) and the federal fund rate (FF). All variables 13. Since these response functions are so similar, only the first is reported in Figure IV . (1,6),...,(31,36) ), provide additional evi- With , < 0, the more the U. S. interest rate exceeds the foreign interest rate, the more the dollar tends to appreciate over the holding period. So rather than offset the differential gains associated with investing in the United States, the expected appreciation of the U. S. exchange rate magnifies those returns. The estimated impulse response functions of time t excess returns EtqPFo discussed in the previous section can be viewed as reflecting a "conditional forward premium bias." In particular, we found that a very specific shock to the system-a contractionary shock to U. S. monetary policy-leads to a fall in R Fr -RIuS and a persistent appreciation in the dollar that magnifies, rather than dampens the expected returns associated with investing in the United States. So our results are complementary to those in the literature and shed light on a specific shock to agents' environments that helps generate the "unconditional forward premium bias."
The literature contains a variety of competing explanations for the unconditional forward premium bias. These may be useful in thinking about the delayed response of exchange rates to monetary policy shocks. Engel [1995] provides a critical review of attempts to account for these puzzles by modeling risk aversion on the part of market participants. Included in this work are tests of the CAPM, tests of latent variable models, portfolio-balance models of risk premiums and general equilibrium models of risk premiums. Frankel and Rose [1994] survey recent work on exchange rates that departs from the assumption of rational expectations. Included here is work that allows for groups of agents whose irrational expectations lead to speculative bubbles via bandwagon effects. A closely related literature uses survey data on exchange rate expectations to shed light on the hypothesis of rational expectations. See Froot and Frankel [1989] , Takagi [1991] , and Frankel and Rose [1994] . Finally, various authors have pursued the possibility that the puzzles discussed above represent small sample phenomena. These might arise because of peso problems or learning about regime shifts. Lewis [1994] provides a survey of work in this area.
Olivier J. Blanchard has pointed out to us that a particular type of small sample problem might be able to rationalize the delayed response of the exchange rate that we documented (see also Gourinchas and Tornell [1995] for closely related work). Suppose that there are two types of shocks to U. S. monetary policy. These induce persistent and transitory shocks, RP and RT, respectively, to the difference between foreign and U. S. interest rates. A decrease in RP or RT corresponds to a contractionary U. S. monetary policy shock. Agents see only current and lagged realizations of RF` -RUs, not the separate realizations of RP and R7. In this environment our identification scheme is misspecified and will isolate some combination of RP and R[. Uncovered interest parity (relationship (4) for j = 0) implies that the time t exchange rate depends on current and all expected future values of RFr -R ts. But the expected value of the future interest rate spread depends on agents' view of current and past realizations of RtP and R[T. Now consider the response of the exchange rate to a negative realization to RP. In the impact period of the shock agents do not know whether the shock to R Ir -RtS reflects a realization of RP or R7. Over time, they will place increasing weight on the possibility that the time t shock was to RP. The dollar continues to appreciate as more weight is placed on this possibility. Since the shock to RP is persistent but not permanent, the exchange rate will eventually return to its preshock level. So as time evolves, the response of the exchange rate will be hump shaped. Could this account for the shape of our estimated impulse response functions? Not in and of itself. This is because here there are two types of interest rate shocks. As time evolves following a shock to Rt, we would observe simple Dornbusch type overshooting. In this example, where both policy shocks are operative, our policy reaction function is misspecified, and our estimated impulse response function represents some combination of the separate response to RT and RP. We have produced examples in which this specification error leads to hump-shaped impulse response functions. However, these examples rely critically on the assumption that the sample over which the VAR is estimated is marked by an unusually large proportion of shocks to RP, relative to the population moments. So this explanation relies on small sample arguments and specification error. Formally pursuing this conjecture empirically is an interesting avenue of research.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated the effects of shocks to monetary policy on nominal and real U. S. exchange rates. We did so using alternative measures of shocks to U. S. monetary policy. We found strong evidence that contractionary policy shocks lead to (i) significant, persistent appreciations in exchange rates, both nominal and real, and (ii) significant, persistent departures from uncovered interest rate parity. The negative interest rate differentials between foreign and U. S. assets are associated with appreciations of the U. S. dollar, rather than the depreciations implied by uncovered interest rate parity. This finding is consistent with the well-documented puzzle that future changes in exchange rates are negatively related to the forward premium.
We conclude by noting that according to our results, shocks to U. S. monetary policy contributed significantly to the overall variability of U. S. exchange rates in the post-Bretton Woods era. In conjunction with our other findings, this highlights important shortcomings of monetized international Real Business Cycle
